bigclawd/dsh-security-guard

🛡️ dsh-security-guard

A security guard for the DeepSeek Harness (dsh). Static scanning and runtime interception that never executes the code it protects you from.

✨ Highlights

🎯 Threat model

🔍 Detector families

• AST pass (src/static/ast.ts) — parses TS/JS with the TypeScript compiler API (ts.createSourceFile), walks the tree, matches rule patterns (ast-call, ast-member, ast-computed, ast-import). Text is never executed.
• Content pass (src/static/content.ts) — regex / phrase / url / file rules over text, code strings, image alt attributes and markdown.
• Token pass — size, base64 ratio, repetition and comment-padding heuristics (src/static/content.ts heuristics, src/rules/token.json tuning).
• Runtime watch (src/runtime/watcher.ts) — pre-step / pre-tool / post-tool gates, shell-pipe and destructive-shell patterns, SSH-write and token-drain telemetry, session usage monitoring.
• Whitelist (src/whitelist.ts) — user-managed allowlist persisted to disk; trust / untrust via CLI or panel.

📦 Rules

Rules are plain JSON bundled under src/rules/ — code.json, injection.json, token.json, allowlist.json. A rulesDir option overrides or extends them by id. The full schema lives in src/rules.ts.

{ "id": "code.eval", "kind": "ast-call", "severity": "block", "callee": ["eval"] }

Matcher kinds: ast-call (calls/new), ast-member (dotted access), ast-computed (computed access on globals — obfuscation signal), ast-import (imports/requires), regex (scoped to all/string/comment), phrase, url, file. Beyond the classic malicious patterns, the bundled rules harden against obfuscation: hex/base64 Buffer.from/toString encodings, long hex-only string payloads, and computed member access on globalThis/global/process are all flagged. The full schema lives in src/rules.ts.

🚀 Usage

Install

dsh plugin --profile default add dsh-security-guard

Host application

import { Context } from '@deepseek-ai/cordis'
import Guard from 'dsh-security-guard'

ctx.plugin(Guard, {
  rulesDir: 'config/guard-rules',          // optional overrides
  scan: { maxFiles: 5000, maxFileSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024, skipSegments: ['node_modules', '.git', 'dist', 'lib'] },
  runtime: { enabled: true, blockOnSeverity: ['block'], maxFindingsPerScan: 200 },
  allowlist: { file: 'data/guard-allowlist.json' },
  web: { enabled: true, path: '/scan' },
  installHook: { enabled: true, intervalMs: 5000 },  // auto-scan newly installed plugins
})

Install hook

The host emits no “package installed” event (dsh plugin add is a separate CLI process), so the guard watches the profile manifest ($DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>/package.json — the only file the CLI rewrites after a successful install). Every package added to its dependencies is statically scanned under node_modules; the report is recorded as a runtime event (source: install), emitted as a guard/install-scan event, and appended to guard-install-scans.jsonl in the profile directory. Disable with installHook: { enabled: false }.

Static scan

/scan ./plugin-dir                 # human-readable report
/scan ./plugin-dir --json          # machine-readable
/scan ./plugin-dir --json --out report.json

Or via the plugin_scan tool with parameters target, severity, json, out.

👁️ Runtime watch

Enabled by default. The guard listens on:

🖥️ Web panel

Served by the harness web server at the configured path (default /scan): live findings, rule overview, allowlist management (trust / untrust), report download.

🧪 Development

pnpm install
pnpm typecheck   # tsc --noEmit
pnpm test        # vitest run (89 tests: static, rules, runtime, whitelist, plugin)
pnpm build       # tsc emit + copy bundled rules into lib/

The test suite runs three fixture families under tests/fixtures/ — clean/, injected/, malicious/ — plus samples/malicious-demo, a deliberately malicious sample plugin that the scanner never executes (scan it with /scan samples/malicious-demo to see it reported).

🔒 Design constraints

• The scanner is purely static: only ts.createSourceFile / ts.createScanner are used; scanned source is never imported, evaluated or executed.
• No unvetted AI-signature or hashing mechanisms; verdicts come from auditable, id-overridable JSON rules.
• Runtime gate decisions use the host’s native PreToolDecision / PostToolDecision / PreStepDecision contracts.

⚠️ Known limits

• Obfuscation is an arms race. Rule patterns reliably catch naive malware, copy-paste samples, and — most importantly — install-time lifecycle scripts in package.json (unhideable: npm requires the literal key). But a determined attacker can still hide payloads behind runtime decoding or encryption. The scanner is a risk-reduction layer, not a security proof.
• False positives exist. Legitimate code can trip heuristic rules (e.g. a hex hash constant); verdicts default to warn, and the allowlist and ruleSeverity overrides handle the rest.
• Scan before install. A malicious postinstall runs the moment the package is installed — scan the package first (/scan), then dsh plugin add.

📄 License

MIT